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China is emerging as the premier economic partner to the Global South. Through 
the ability to loan large amounts of hard currency, supply inexpensive industrial and 
consumer products, and diversify their economic interests, China plays a key role in the 
new global marketplace. The Chinese system of investment diversification forms the 
foundation of their commercial diplomacy. One advantage China enjoys is a general lack 
of proselytization on issues such as good-governance and environmental safety standards.
This makes for more lucrative business partnerships with many states increasingly 
dissatisfied with the burdens of “over regulation.” As China extends its reach into 
commercial and strategic raw material industries, it creates more reliable supply lines for 
its own industrial revolution. The Chinese system of economic growth and political 
outreach has been developed by government ministries working in concert with private 
businesses partially directed by the wider foreign policy goals of the state. This paper 
discusses the Nigerian petroleum sector, particularly in regard to the constructive market 
impact of Chinese assistance and expansion. Further expansion and increasing investment
by Chinese companies into strategic and commercial minerals has led to the growth of 
extensive partnerships in Central Africa. Nigeria is the largest most developed economic 
power in Africa with a vast consumer market and rich in mineral wealth. Due to these 
factors it makes that country a prime example of the power of long term investment. As 
time goes on, those raw materials and the associated industries currently being developed 
will represent a larger controlling share of the market. The components and mechanisms 
fueling our current technological revolution depend on those industries and will continue 
to do so for the foreseeable future. Africa’s resource rich landscape will be the ultimate 
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proving ground of China’s ability to use commercial diplomacy to acquire a large share 
of strategic resources. 
1) Introduction
From colonial possessions to developed but still deeply frail states, many of the 
countries in Central Africa have tried to use outside investment to expand their 
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economies and grow their internal infrastructure.1 The recent surge of Chinese investment
across the African continent has taken many forms, including loans, foreign direct 
investment, and technical assistance. The scale and generosity of these programs has 
created a strong series of bilateral relationships as well as the expansion into untapped 
strategic and commercial raw materials. 
Consider, for example, the case of Nigeria and its massive oil reserves. Chinese 
development of the Nigerian petroleum sector has acted as a springboard to further 
investments in the most populous country and the largest economy on the African 
continent. Chinese investment across other major economic sectors has the distinct effect 
of making Nigeria into a model of contemporary Chinese economic relations.2 This, in 
turn, has led to industrial development and assistance; becoming the cornerstone of wider
diplomatic forays into regions never before valued by Beijing.3 
I argue that the size and scope of Chinese financial assistance on the African 
continent is part of a well-focused plan to exert strategic influence over expanding and 
emerging markets, and increase China’s share of the global marketplace. This form of 
commercial diplomacy expands the “Chinese brand,” opening new roads for the growth 
of capital and resource dominance in the region.4 
1 Zafar, Ali. "The growing relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic, trade, 
investment, and aid links." The World Bank Research Observer 22.1 (2007): Pg. 122.
2 Ikpefan, Ochei Ailemen. "Challenges of Public-Private Partnership in Infrastructure Financing in Nigeria." 
The Nigerian Accounting Horizon, University of Jos 4.1: (2008): Pg. 61.
3 Freeman, Charles, and Xiaoqing Lu Boynton. "China’s Emerging Global Health and Foreign Aid 
Engagement in Africa." Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (2011)
4 Insaidoo, Kwame A. “CHINA: the New Imperialists & Neo-Colonialists in Africa?”. AuthorHouse, (2016): 
Pg. 14
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Through large scale loans and investing in resource extracting industries, Chinese 
corporations and government-run companies are able to exert powerful influence on the 
development of African petroleum as well as a number of other finite strategic resources. 
This process, coupled with the diplomatic overtures led by Beijing to the governments of 
much of Central Africa combine into what I call “Chinese Commercial Diplomacy.” The 
ability to muster large development loans and technical expertise to work on a variety of 
economic development projects has led the way to making Chinese assistance very 
beneficial for those countries dependent on developing their natural resources. The ability
to access oil and maintain its secure flow to larger developed countries gives those in 
control of the pipelines more power and influence over the market.  As China grows its 
economic stake in Nigeria, they also increase their percentage of ownership of one of the 
largest under-tapped oil reserves in the world. This will cause China to achieve greater 
energy independence.
My methodology relies on the use of reports assessing and comparing the size and
scope of Chinese financial and technical assistance across Nigeria’s petroleum sector. 
This is a case study for similar projects across the continent. This region and economic 
sector were chosen due to their central location in the established and still emerging 
economic transition to modern production methods and development. I evaluate the 
success of China’s commercial diplomacy by examining Chinese investment in--and 
indeed the expansion of--the Nigerian petroleum sector. Furthermore, the growth and 
scope of Chinese investment in Central Africa’s major mining sectors will track the 
drastic upward slope in overall capital investment and mineral diversification. The 
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measurement of the overall positive commercial impact of this type of investment can be 
seen through the growing economic influence and market expansion, year by year, by 
Chinese companies, and their growing share of expanding and emerging markets relative 
to the decreasing domestic control of those markets.  
The primary goal of this research is to understand the Chinese approach to 
bilateral industrial investment and to show that China’s investment is increasing their 
control and access to key strategic oil reserves necessary to ensure their continued 
economic development. In 2004 China began investing in a wide variety of African 
commercial ventures and resource development. Within five years they were the largest 
trading partner to the whole continent. This trend is interesting given China’s history of 
relatively isolationist policies.5 The branching out for resources access is not a new 
occurrence. However, the size and scope of Chinese intervention in Nigerian, and wider 
African petroleum production, shows the extreme importance of creating a safe reliable 
source of energy to fuel future economic ambitions. 
5 Pozzebon, Stefano. “China has crossed a major investment threshold that is going to change the entire 
world.” Business Insider, (2015)
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2) Literature Review
This chapter reviews the work on Nigerian-Chinese economic partnership, the 
development of the wider relationship between the two, and its effect on their shared 
commodity industries. The main goal of reviewing this research is to utilize the vast work
already conducted on the subject matter to build a new explanation. . I discuss the various
methods and aims of Chinese economic diplomacy in Nigeria, and those business 
practices aimed toward the expansion of influence and control over key strategic 
resources--in this case oil. The sources chronicle the numerous reasons and methods 
behind the building of closer political and trade relationships by China throughout Africa.
The three main areas of background research are: 1) Chinese Economic 
Diplomacy; 2) Nigeria‘s petroleum industry and the role played by China; 3) Nigerian 
and Chinese trade relations
a) Chinese Economic Diplomacy 
The need to participate and influence global markets, particularly with regard to 
strategic and energy resources, is crucial for any emerging world power. As China grows 
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its global brand it requires new partnerships and a steady access to the resources 
necessary for growth. The concept of Chinese Economic Diplomacy acts as a road map to
navigate those relationships and act in concert with the needs of Beijing. Central Africa 
has proved to be an optimal testing ground for those policies. There is a wide array of 
resources on this subject covering a variety of angles. Some of the research focused on 
economic development, while others focused on human rights and the impact on the 
environment. It was important to find impartial sources which discussed these ideas free 
from ideological constraints.
According to Nabine the fundamental objective of his research is to ascertain the 
impact of Nigerian exports/imports and Chinese FDI on Nigerian economic 
development.6 The paper also provided background on how economic growth responds to
offset some of the wider regional trade imbalances. Nabine regards the connection 
between Chinese trade and the Nigerian economy as linked inevitably to the much 
ignored contribution of the Chinese FDI as the main indicator of expanded influence. On 
the topic of overall trade imbalance and the increased Chinese influence over the energy 
industry, Nabine left too many questions unanswered and instead tended to focus solely 
on the overall role Chinese FDI has played in the bilateral trade partnership. This was 
helpful to set a big picture of how investment structures work, but required a combination
of other research to properly fill in the blanks in the overall assessment.  
Ikejiaku applies liberal economic theories on dependency to explain the African 
debt crisis and the roots of mistrust and caution that many African governments have for 
Western sources of investment; particularly the IMF and the World Bank.  This was 
6 Nabine, D. "The impact of Chinese investment and trade on Nigeria economic growth." ATPC Work in 
progress 77 (2009)
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helpful in establishing some systemic reasons for the preference of Chinese FDI and the 
impact of decades of imposed fines, loans, and market corrections on Central Africa over 
the past 40 years. Ikejiku concludes that while the Nigerian government is in some ways 
to blame for their situation, the missteps by the international community and Western 
investment practices were the primary cause of economic hardship. This paper wasn’t 
particularly objective to the possibilities of new coercive predatory lending, and left an 
objective gap in the impact played by domestic Nigerian corruption.7 The themes were 
still useful in understanding the reluctance of many African economies to adopt one set of
standards in a trading partner, but willingness to embrace another. While, from the 
perspective of Lengauer, the ability of non-aligned and emerging economic powers, such 
as the BRICS, to become “sponsors” and donor countries allows them the freedom to 
pursue their own economic needs free of the influence of the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). This has given Beijing opportunities to follow 
their main “foreign policy priority”, namely the expansion of the Chinese economy and 
its influence over an increasing share of the global marketplace. Lengauer further argues 
that the inherent unreliability of Chinese sources for energy have spurred the main thrust 
of this economic diplomacy while countries like the United States have been trying to 
focus on mainly increasing domestic energy production while decreasing energy 
consumption.8 Her use of white papers, statistics, and policy initiatives by the Ministries 
7 Ikejiaku, Brian-Vincent. "Africa Debt Crisis and the IMF with a Case of Nigeria: towards Theoretical 
explanations." Journal of Politics and Law 1, no. 4 (2008)
8 Lengauer, Sara. "China's foreign aid policy: Motive and method," Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the 
Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies: Vol. 9: Iss. 2, Article 3. (2011)
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of Commerce, Foreign Affairs, and Financial Affairs, helped to build the case for a top 
down trade policy with ambitions and goals far surpassing solely economic interests. 
b) Nigeria‘s petroleum industry and the role played by China
Alden and Alves analyze Chinese growing interaction with the mineral sector and 
on Nigerian energy production. Now as the largest petroleum consumer and third largest 
petroleum importer, China has, based on the analysis, has created a framework to gain 
access to new sources of strategic minerals. Alden views the Chinese system in the scope 
of the “Angola mode” which exchanges development money and FDI for raw resources 
and certain controls on overall production and mining of those resources. While the focus
tends to stray away from the importance of oil imports in favor of looking at the overall 
mineral mining sector the structure of a grand strategy to secure and expand control vital 
African resources emerges in the narrative. This piece was particularly useful in its 
analysis of different types of applications of the same Chinese concepts in the use of FDI.
The report does leave unanswered questions as to the governing forces behind those 
moves, but that is what this research paper is attempting to discuss and evaluate.9 
Whitfield’s book offers an approach to understanding the relationship between aid
donors and recipient African governments. While official statements stress that form 
forms of aid do not come with the same external baggage as in the past, the author shows 
that manty Western versions of FDI and loaning governments have merely repackaged 
old forms of control to new trade deals. Much of the information Whitfield collects is in 
9 Alden, Chris, and Ana Cristina Alves. “China and Africa's natural resources: The challenges and 
implications for development and governance.” Johannesburg: South African Institute of International 
Affairs, (2009)
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the form of interviews done with those involved in the aid acquisition process from both 
ends of the spectrum. There is a stressed look at the redefinition of terms such as 
“ownership” and “oversight” which have been seen as attempts to repackage old mistakes
as new initiatives. This mistrust caused by the African financial crises over the past 
decades have led to the embracing of less hands on approaches by Chinese FDI and 
African tactics to approach aid from a more practical standpoint. Her conclusions about 
the changing nature of African governments in relation to their bilateral trade and aid 
acquisition helped this paper frame both the need and the shape that modern aid 
relationships are being built in the region.10 This also touched on concepts about the effect
of FDI on African business and social culture. While outside of the scope of this 
particular paper, that topic would be a fascinating follow-up.
c) Nigerian and Chinese trade relations 
Hess and Aidoo examine the beginning of the pattern of non-interference with 
trading partners as a pillar of Chinese foreign policy. While publically the promotion of 
noninterference as the standard in negotiated trade partnerships, since the economic 
reforms of Deng Xiaoping, the utilitarian needs of increased raw materials and energy 
sources have cause the policy to evolve. Hess’ take is that China no longer feels the need 
to stand by an outdated more revolutionary ideological model and that more can be 
achieved by backdoor policy positioning than had been in the past. The authors conclude 
that the practice in conjunction with increasing trade and influence is becoming 
unrealistic and that new tactics and steps have been designed to promote noninterference 
10 Whitfield, Lindsay. “The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors: African Strategies for
Dealing with Donors.” Oxford University Press, (2008)
12
publically (to promote pro-Chinese sentiments and counteract accusations of coercion 
and corruption) while taking a more prominent position in the future of Chinese interests 
passing current levels of economic and commercial partnership. These methods gave a 
more evolutionary perspective to the policy priorities and nature of political process 
taking hold in the past decade.11 This helped form the idea for looking at the wider scope 
of how these policy priorities develop and the overlap between private enterprise and 
government direction. 
Lum took a statistically critical look at the increase in Chinese aid from year to 
year and region to region over the five year period of 2002 to 2007. The look at this as a 
metric to extrapolate the influence of China’s soft power has been a helpful tool in 
understanding the wider use of development money to create access to new markets and 
expand old ones. The author also defines the differences between development dollars 
and the overall regional strategies implemented by the foreign ministry in Beijing. These 
conclusions include the idea that China’s main goals in Africa and South America are 
more in line with their short term economic development plans, while recent forays into 
East and South Asia represent a Chinese long term diplomatic strategy aimed at 
becoming the main leader in the region both strategically and economically. Throughout 
this report and in many of the other pieces analyzed there continues the overall theme of a
multifaceted highly developed long term plan for shaping global markets and opinions to 
become more in line with Beijing’s policy priorities.12 This theme became more 
11 Hess, Steve, and Richard Aidoo. "Beyond the Rhetoric: Noninterference in China’s African Policy." 
African and Asian Studies 9, no. 3 (2010)
12 Lum, Thomas, Hannah Fischer, Julissa Gomez-Granger, and Anne Leland. "China's foreign aid activities 
in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia." Russia China and Eurasia-Social Historical and Cultural Issues 
25, no. 2 (2009)
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prominent throughout the research. This then led the nature of Chinese government 
intervention in FDI to fulfill foreign policy goals to become a cornerstone of this paper. 
Kragelund’s paper on Chinese investments in Africa uses Zambia as a case study 
the growth of Chinese private enterprise and investment in the vacuum of Western backed
economic development plans and private initiatives.  While Zambia was not the focus of 
this work the systems used by Chinese venture capitalists are very similar to those used 
throughout the region, including Nigeria. The practical application of these methods is 
important to the understanding of the increased importance of outside capital to develop 
domestic African economies. There are gaps in information regarding other country’s 
independent business models trying to accomplish the same thing and their success rate, 
but overall it provided significant information on the private sector initiatives being 
taken.13 Kragelund provided clear data needed to assess the findings put forth in this 
paper. The use of multiple countries in his case study helped show the diversification of 
those initiatives. 
Within their article Tan-Mullins, Mohan, and Power discuss the differing 
ideological constraints and methods used by Chinese and Western courses of investment 
and aid. The authors have tried to avoid the pitfalls of assessing the morality of those 
strategies and rather focused on comparing the impact of overall aid to economic 
development and the development of the energy industries. The main case studies used 
are the petroleum and coal sectors of Ghana and Angola using both Chinese and Western 
aid packages. The overall conclusions rely on the concept that whether the outcome for 
the African state in question is net-positive or net-negative, that both methods are in part 
13 Kragelund, Peter. "Knocking on a wide-open door: Chinese investments in Africa." Review of African 
Political Economy 36, no. 122 (2009)
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coercive and that the donor country tends to hide the true motives of aid based economic 
relations despite what ideological form they might subscribe to. It was refreshing to see 
the “moral superiority” of Western aid practices called into question when much of the 
analysis and work done on this subject tends to highlight the coercive and “deceptive” 
nature of Chinese aid, while explaining away the improprieties of Western aid in the past 
as a miscalculation of economic development goals.14 The distinction of one over the 
other is inherently sloppy and disingenuous. This however comes into direct conflict with
Kolstad and his assessment of 29 African countries using Chinese FDI from 2003-2006. 
Kolstad argues that rather than being more or less open to trade with any country across 
the continent, that Chinese businesses go out of their way to look for opportunities which 
give access to the highest number of resource rich areas in countries lacking developed 
fair institutional controls. Thereby those actors involved make those areas of interest 
prominent due to their exploitability rather than the fulfillment of long term strategic or 
political goals.15 
Several key terms will be used throughout this paper. When China is conducting 
what is referred to here as “economic diplomacy” being defined as: 
“…government service to the business community [and the state], 
it means the overall aims of the development of socially beneficial 
business ventures. It is the work of diplomatic missions in support of the 
home county’s business and finance sectors and includes the promotion of 
14 Tan‐Mullins, May, Giles Mohan, and Marcus Power. "Redefining ‘aid’ in the China Africa
context." Development and Change 41, no. 5 (2010)
15 Kolstad, Ivar, and Arne Wiig. "Better the devil you know? Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa." 
Journal of African Business 12, no. 1 (2011)
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inward and outward investment, as well as trade. Commercial diplomacy 
consequently includes ‘all aspects of business support and promotion 
(trade, investment, tourism, science, and technology, protection of 
intellectual property)”16 
The term Global South, “refers to the countries of the rest of the world, most of 
which are located in the Southern Hemisphere which are included within medium to low 
scales of human development, largely agrarian economies, generally lack in reliable civil 
institutions or civic infrastructure”, such as Nigeria in this case.17 
Investment, such as the Chinese industrial investment packages being applied 
across the African continent, includes financial and technical assistance to the Nigerian 
petroleum sector. Our primary concern is looking at the overall positive or negatives 
changes between increased Chinese intervention and assistance, and its effect on China’s 
market share of Nigerian oil. 
The term predatory trade refers to the extractive nature of natural resources or 
coercive control over key economic sectors. The donor nation is in a position to 
manipulate their partner’s national assets, resources, and land in a way that benefits the 
donor state. It may also damage or undermine the governing and economic integrity of 
the recipient state. While both economic symbiosis and predatory trade are both extreme 
16 Ruel, Huub. “Commercial Diplomacy in International Entrepreneurship: A Conceptual and Empirical 
Exploration”. Emerald Group Publishing, (2012): Pg. 31
17 Ikejiaku, Brian-Vincent. "Africa Debt Crisis and the IMF with a Case of Nigeria: towards Theoretical 
explanations." Journal of Politics and Law 1, no. 4 (2008): Pg. 2
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terms, there will be a considerable amount of care given to distinguish between their 
varied and inevitably complicated spectrum of shades of grey.18 
The term economic (trade) symbiosis is defined as an interaction between two 
different countries/states/groups living in close economic association and cooperation, 
typically to the advantage of both in a spirit of beneficial mutual collaboration.19 That’s 
what the previous literature says, but it’s missing a practical analysis of the workings of 
Chinese foreign policy directives in conjunction with private enterprise. In addition, there
is a lack of information about the abilities our habits of government directly steering 
private Chinese firms to a particular project, industry, region, or country. There are clear 
roadmaps put forth in the literature previously discussed, but the aim of this paper is to 
restructure that into a top-down look at the effect of government intervention in FDI and 
its use as a foreign policy tool in Africa. 
18 Sautman, Barry, and Yan Hairong. "Trade, investment, power and the China-in-Africa discourse." The 
Asia-Pacific Journal 52, no. 3 (2009)
19 Kolstad, Ivar, and Arne Wiig. "Better the devil you know? Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa." 
Journal of African Business 12, no. 1 (2011): Pg. 34
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3) The features of Chinese economic diplomacy
This section will discuss the history and modern application of Chinese economic 
diplomacy. From the opening of Chinese markets in the past few decades, the original 
economic reforms have taken the new form of socialism with Chinese characteristics. 
New foreign policy goals and priorities for Beijing require the merging of these economic
and political powers.
a) The background of Chinese economic diplomacy
Chinese commercial diplomacy and extension of its soft power have been most 
efficiently accomplished by the expansion of the Chinese consumer market and the 
securing of raw materials. This has mainly been done through investment in those 
countries which can both provide those materials but have a lack of domestic production. 
The “peaceful rise of China” has at its heart a message of financial prosperity and 
economic development throughout their growing relationships with other countries in the 
world. Africa, for a variety of growth factors and resource wealth, is an excellent 
platform to test the strategies and theories of Chinese business initiatives. China’s 
approach to economic diplomacy has evolved from the original concepts brought forward
during the economic reforms of the 1990s, to the most recent global turmoil brought 
about by the lasting effects of the 2008 financial crisis. The leadership in Beijing has 
invested fulfil in developing the trade priorities of the PRC into one of the preeminent 
trading powers in the world. The reforms continued by the succession of premierships 
have directed China’s further integration into not only East Asia but the rest of the globe. 
Beijing has been actively lobbying the international community and international 
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organizations to modify common laws and trade practices to better met the short term 
issues faced by Chinese industry, and the move to protect IP to develop and secure the 
needed technological resources required for the future. The competitiveness of Chinese 
goods, labor, and investments in the global marketplace are at the forefront of the 
Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ agendas. Due to the missteps of the 
United States in the Middle East, and the fallout from the Great Recession, China has 
found its desired role escalating at a significant rate the last decade. While increased trade
and development are of primary importance, the need for energy independence, or at the 
very least, reliable sources of energy is a cornerstone of short and long term Chinese 
military, diplomatic, and economic strategic planning. Economic growth and expansion is
essential for the security of the state.
Africa’s previous experience with development loans is decidedly mixed. The 
Europeans, Americans, and IMF all have had mixed results with regard to African 
sovereignty, debt obligations, and a lack of domestic collaboration. The scope of the 
African debt crisis and the damage done by the actions of the inflexible lenders and 
growth-stifling payments for past development loans, and the subsequent fallout of the 
economic crisis, has caused FDI providers to reevaluate the way they do business. The 
Nigerian-Chinese relationship has developed and evolved since relations were first 
formally established in the 1970’s into, what is now, a key strategic and economic 
partnership which has helped define China’s place as a global power. In addition it has 
also helped define Nigeria’s place as a major economic and political leader on the African
continent. The relationship between Nigeria and China can in many ways been seen as a 
model for economic symbiosis. Previous economic relationships have failed to generate 
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successful growth and development in Africa. The reduction of Western assistance and 
FDI from much of the African continent in the 1980’s, and the subsequent chaotic 
political and economic environment in the 1990’s, had led many American and European 
companies to go elsewhere to develop foreign markets and facilitate trade. It was in part 
due to this “investment vacuum” that opened the door for Chinese development and 
investment packages. These packages have been pushed forward by Chinese government 
ministries and have drastically changed the nature of Chinese trade relations. It has also 
made an astronomical impact in many African states, including Nigeria. This vacuum was
essential to the current wave of overseas investments being generated by Chinese 
companies. China and much of Africa had not felt the range and depth of negative 
economic effects experienced by the United States and other developed economies. The 
mineral and energy sectors were subsequently lightly affected in Africa until the most 
recent oil price drops. 
The idea of a singular power making such inroads into the economic development
and resource access of an entire region has in the past represented something of a colonial
mindset.  Chinese expansion into the Nigerian petroleum sector has rapidly increased the 
engagement of Chinese capital investment and the need to build strategic partnerships 
with these countries. Nigeria and China are becoming strong economic partners. There is 
still concern however that this won’t create an equally beneficial relationship.  
“China's increasing presence in Nigeria, and elsewhere in Africa, 
has spurred much speculation about the nature of the emerging partnership
model. A national debate across sectors on this partnership will be a 
healthy exercise and may drive more rigorous analysis of what best serves 
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African countries' quest for human material advance; friendly, mutually 
beneficial relations in trade and politics; and stewardship of the shared 
heritage of the planet.”20 
While many aspects of this partnership are not indicative of the relations between 
other African states and China that does not mean that evaluating the positive effects and 
potential pitfalls of those policies and their long term impacts on national and local 
societies can’t be effectively applied other states in the future. Nigeria possesses a larger 
and more educated population than most of the continent, in addition to a strong federal 
system more capable of taking on the bureaucratic and systemic requirements to grow its 
heavy industry in symbiosis with foreign investment.
“…the government of Shagari is noted to have assessed the IMF 
financial facilities after approaching the institution on loan assessment 
sometimes in 1983. Nigeria, under Shagari’s regime sought to borrow $2 
billion from the fund, largely to help refinance, and had initiated 
negotiation with IMF. However its trade debt then estimated to be between
$3 billion and $5 billion has not been serviced, and Nigeria was unwilling 
to comply with IMF guidelines; therefore, his administration did not 
succeed in getting the IMF loan (Biersteker, 1993). And by the period 
Shagari left office in 1983, Nigeria was indebted to $14,130.7 million 
(CBN Annual Report, 1988).”21
20 Nabine, D. "The impact of Chinese investment and trade on Nigeria economic growth." Pg. 1
21 Ikejiaku, Brian-Vincent. Journal of Politics and Law, Pg. 6
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        The repayment penalties inflicted on the country by their financiers in the 
wake of this administrative meltdown further exacerbated the problems Nigeria 
would experience for more than two decades after the original loans had been 
called in. The cost of development may be corruption and economic dependency 
on the part of the receiver country. This lesson was clearly learned by the 
governments of central and southern Africa and their interactions with the new 
Chinese forms of development loans have been shaped by these past exchanges.22
FDI is commonly used as a tool of foreign policy and in many ways political 
coercion. This tactic is particularly useful in command-control economies and those 
countries, such as China, where private enterprise of any size operates in direct 
conjunction with the policies and whims of the central government. The strategic 
placement of development loans and technical assistance provides a clear framework for 
the motivations of long term Chinese development goals in the Global South. The 
emerging regional and world powers are changing the world economic system to produce
more financially friendly results outside of the stock markets of New York, London, and 
Tokyo. The ability for these countries to pick and choose their international expansion 
with considerable financial resources and little historic or colonial baggage is an 
invaluable asset in expanding economic ties and fiscal diversification. China must be 
viewed not as an anomaly but as the harbinger of the “new normal” of international 
investment.23 Despite China’s slowing economic growth rate, Chinese trade on the 
22 Ikejiaku, Brian-Vincent. Journal of Politics and Law, Pg. 2
23 Lengauer, Sara (2011) "China's foreign aid policy: Motive and method," Culture Mandala: The Bulletin 
of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies: Vol. 9: Iss. 2, Article 3. 
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African continent has expanded at a rapid pace; reaching a total value of US$170 billion 
in 2013.24 
“Statistics compiled by the Ministry of Commerce of China 
suggest that outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) flows in the natural
resource sector on average accounted for 20.7% of total OFDI flows over 
the period 2004-2009, and the average annual growth rate of OFDI flows 
in this sector was 104.6% over the same period (MOFCOM, 2009).”25 
The access of resources, such as oil, is strategically significant both in terms of 
economic growth and reliability. The ability for MNEs and MNCs to act as a financial 
go-between between states allows for some political protection against accusations of 
giving one other country significant entry into a market of vital national importance. 
MNCs insulate the both governments from requires in certain regional and bilateral 
treaties which would otherwise have to be complied with. This system turns bilateral 
relations into a business venture using corporations as a third party arbiter.
The petroleum industry in Nigeria accounts for 85% of the country’s export 
revenue. As of 2014 the Nigerian pumping capacity can produce in excess of 2.2 million 
barrels of crude oil per day; and it’s growing26 In addition, it is estimated that Nigeria and 
24 Pigato, Miria, and Wenxia Tang. “China and Africa: Expanding economic ties in an evolving global 
context.” World Bank, (2015): Pg. 2
25 Li, Jing, et al. "The Two‐Tier Bargaining Model Revisited: Theory and Evidence from China's Natural 
Resource Investments in Africa." Global Strategy Journal 3.4 (2013): Pg. 3
26 Fantini, Alvino-Mario, ed. “OPEC – Annual Statistical Bulletin: 2014.” OPEC 6th International Seminar. Pg.
8
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its surrounding coastline contains over 30% of all petroleum reserves on the African 
continent, making it a powerhouse as an energy producer with massive untapped 
potential.27 Like many other major oil producing countries, they are at serious risk of 
falling into what is called in economics as the Dutch disease. This is the connection 
between the increase in the economic development of certain natural resources and a 
serious decline in the agricultural and industrial sectors. Oil, unfortunately, tends to make 
countries resort to a severe type of resource dependency which can have catastrophic 
economic consequences since the value of the country’s currency and economy is 
invariably linked to the market strength of the commodity they possess. This leaves 
Nigeria seriously susceptible to market forces outside of its own control, and while oil 
wealth is spurring on many other sectors of development, it is still entirely too dominant a
force in the economy. Even the Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, 
Industry, Mines and Agriculture’s (NACCIMA) Director-General Dr. John Isemede stated
that “the oil sector is creating distortion in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors 
which are the main engines of an economy. This kills the economy silently.”28 Into this 
fray entered Chinese investment and development companies such as PetroChina and 
later on the CNOOC Group (China National Offshore Oil Corporation).29 
“In December 2005, CNOOC bought a 45% stake in an offshore 
Nigerian oil field for $2.27 billion, China’s largest foreign acquisition to 
27 Downs, Erica Strecker. "The fact and fiction of Sino-African energy relations." Pg. 43
28 Adaramola, Zakariyya. “Nigeria: Naccima Says Oil Sector Is Killing Economy.” AllAfrica. 
29 Frynas, Jedrzej George, and Manuel Paulo. "A new scramble for African oil? Historical, political, and 
businessperspectives." African Affairs Pg. 231
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date, eclipsing Chinese computer manufacturer Lenovo’s $1.75 billion 
purchase of IBM’s personal computer business in 2004....And, as China 
projects its commercial power abroad, strategic competition with US and 
European interests is increasing.”30
 With the rapid influx of capital and technological expertise from 1998- 2012, the 
Nigeria petroleum industry rapidly grew until it has hit its current production point, 
where it is now financing nearly the entire Nigerian government. In general West African 
oil production in the last decade has grown at such a rate as to outstrip every other oil 
producing region except the Middle East. The gradual takeover of the reins of petroleum 
development from nationalized Nigerian companies will cause large sectors of Nigeria’s 
main export and source of wealth to not only become susceptible to the will of the 
market, but in many instances, be forced to bow to the will of Beijing. 
        “The most noteworthy point about Africa in China’s foreign aid is the
rising percentage of aid received by the continent. In the 2011 white paper,
aid to Africa in 2009 made up 45.7 percent of China’s total aid, while, 
from 2010 to 2012 the share for Africa climbed to 51.8 percent. This 6.1 
percentage point increase is the largest among all regions[…] Given the 
overall volume of Chinese aid and Africa’s growing share, it is apparent 
that Chinese aid to Africa has been on the rise.  This trend forms a sharp 
contrast to OECD countries’ decreasing bilateral aid to sub-Saharan 
30 Alden, Chris, and Martyn Davies. "A profile of the operations of Chinese multinationals in Africa." South
African journal of international affairs Pg. 91
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Africa, which dropped 7.9 percent in 2012 and another 4 percent in 
2013”31
The Chinese investment firms and energy companies involved in these large scale
acquisitions have been formed out of larger Chinese government ministries for the 
purpose of expanding their arm over key strategic resource areas. For the time being, 
Nigeria’s highly sought after delta light sweet crude oil is the main point of interest for 
most international investment in the country, and as companies and nations attempt to 
outbid and outdo one another, it is to the Nigerian people’s advantage to exploit their 
burgeoning relationship with the People’s Republic of China and the vast potential for 
internal and external development their assistance can hold for the entire country.  
Chinese Multi-National Corporations (MNC) have strategies and a series of 
initiatives that have become repeated behaviors. One such behavior is to join existing 
joint-ventures with companies who have “possible inroads into the political establishment
of countries with which it has only limited ties.”32 China’s energy dependency has 
become the first and foremost priority of Beijing. Currently as the second largest energy 
consumer and third largest importer, it’s dependent on fluctuating global markets. This is 
a significant impediment to the role that China visualizes itself being in as a new global 
power. “Until 1990, its principal suppliers were Indonesia, the sultanate of Oman, and 
Iran. Extending the list of its suppliers has become imperative because of its increasing 
31 Sun, Yan. "Africa in China’s New Foreign Aid White Paper." Africa in Focus, Brookings Online. 
Washington D.C. (2014)
32 Alden, Chris, and Martyn Davies. South African journal of international affairs Pg. 87
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domestic consumption and the depletion of Indonesian reserves.”33  As a matter of 
consequence Africa has become a relatively uncontested area of Chinese participation in 
energy development and extraction. Africa allows for the reduction of Chinese 
dependency on energy supplies in unstable and unfriendly areas, while opening up further
access to 8.9% of global oil reserves. At present, China’s vulnerability in the energy 
sector has been shrinking, even as overall economic growth has slowed, and in some 
sectors, stagnated.
Another trend is the desire to acquire access to foreign energy assets and 
resources, such as petroleum and coal deposits. Access to state capital for these projects is
a main driving motivation for Chinese MNCs to enter into certain energy rich markets as 
opposed to others. In terms of overall trade finance, energy acquisition, and its related 
investment, accounts for a substantive share of current Chinese investments. It will 
continue to for some time. 
“China’s emphasis on securing reliable sources of minerals in 
Africa for its own economy is also reflected in its approach to vertical 
integration and ownership of oil production facilities through to 
transportation tankers. As a means of securing oil for Chinese consumers 
below international market prices, instead of buying rights for future 
exploration and development, Chinese enterprises have concentrated on 
purchasing equity shares in established oil fields.”34
33 Lafargue, François. "China’s presence in Africa." China perspectives 61 (2005). Section 10
34 Whalley, John. “China’s Integration in the World Economy” World Scientific Publishing Company, 
(2011): Pg. 247
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In dealing with the more extractive industries vertical integration has become an 
effective tactic in facilitating further commercial control over these resources. Vertical or 
backward integration is the expansion of commercial investment into assets which make 
the most use out the particular desired resource. By acquiring the power plants or 
refineries which the extracted resources are bound for, those companies can exert certain 
controls over their price and market value. By further investing into these “upstream 
assets” these MNCs can use their influence in the industries to acquire the raw materials 
afterwards instead of doing so originally. This then acts as using a financial backdoor to 
control the entire energy cycle of the resource in question.35
b) Increased trade and financial influence in Nigeria
The adaptable nature of African economies to the “new normal” of Asian 
investment dollars on an unprecedented scale is shaping the commercial and industrial 
markets of the region. Analysis of the weaknesses and discrepancies in Chinese 
investment policy focus on the lack of strong civil society within China itself, making it 
difficult to deal with these types of institutions abroad. “Chinese economic interests in 
Nigeria can be broadly classified into two: private and public. Information from the 
Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) revealed that Chinese private FDI 
are mostly in agro-allied industry, manufacturing and communications sectors.”36  The 
growth of GONGOs (government organized NGOs) fill in the gaps that investment policy
35 Alden, Chris, and Martyn Davies. Pg. 86
36 Oyeranti, Olugboyega A., et al. "The impact of China-Africa investment relations: the case of Nigeria." 
AERC Collaborative Research China-Africa Project Policy Brief 8.6 (2010)
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has had to deal with in the past. Free from many of the institutional memories of past 
imperialism, China views itself and indeed projects itself, as a beneficial older brother 
coming to the aid of a former colonial possession and in support of development across 
all sectors of the economy and society.37 While this assessment is perhaps too benevolent, 
it would be too simple to view China’s actions as purely predatory. In fact the close 
partnership and ties between Abuja and Beijing have been a major catalyst for the rise in 
Nigerian GDP, and its increased share of the global marketplace. While many of its 
citizens have not shared in the benefits brought by Chinese investment and development 
projects, whether due to design or corruption, it still has caused an escalation of industrial
capabilities and agricultural output. Through Chinese investments and cooperative efforts
with Nigerian companies, industry, and government the petroleum sector is booming. 
While this comes with a host of connected benefits and problems, at least in the short 
term it can give Nigeria a serious boost to develop a 21st century economy.
The impact of foreign aid and technical assistance on growth and the effectiveness
of technical versus non-technical assistance within foreign aid use empirical data to 
analyze aid as a fraction of GDP and institutional development levels. They come to the 
conclusion that when presented with a theoretical growth model for small open 
economies (such as Nigeria and Kenya) the biggest impact made by TA and NTA is the 
ability to reduce income disparities within the state, particularly when referring to TA 
(technical assistance) in a fairly well administered locality.38 
37 Alden, Chris, and Daniel Large. "China's exceptionalism and the challenges of delivering difference in 
Africa." Journal of Contemporary China 20.68 (2011): Pg. 21
38 Annen, Kurt, and Stephen Kosempel. "Foreign Aid, Donor Fragmentation, and Economic
Growth." The BE Journal of Macroeconomics 9, no. 1 (2009)
29
c) The political elements behind commercial diplomacy
The difference between the promotion of foreign loans from large economic 
powers versus assistance from smaller economies in the facilitation of economic reform 
is the amount of influence gained over the receiving country. In the wake of the Cold 
War, global market powers pursued their strategic interests at the expense of local 
development needs. For example, the US invested in petroleum and heavy industry, 
which did little to generate growth or aid the local population.
“Integral to any such approach, however, will be the expectation 
that – owing to weak state institutions, high incidence of conflict and 
relative economic fragility of most African countries – developments in 
Africa, independent of U.S.-China relations, will repeatedly test U.S. and 
Chinese approaches and their resolve to work collaboratively. It will be no
less important to anticipate that enduring philosophical, ideological and 
programmatic differences, mutual suspicions and misunderstandings, and 
competitive tensions will sustain the risk of a clash of U.S.-China interests
in Africa. Hence the special need to anticipate flash points in approaches 
to Africa and manage them preemptively: most importantly, at this point, 
are crises such as Darfur, sensitive assistance issues such as debt and 
harmonization of donor approaches, and access to energy resources.”39
39 Gill, Bates, Chin-hao Huang, and J. Stephen Morrison. "Assessing China’s growing influence in Africa." 
China Security 3.3 (2007): Pg. 17.
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 This assessment attempts to prove the strategic and growth benefits of 
development loans are more closely associated with inter-regional assistance, and its 
ability to promote more positive economic changes and inclusion. This establishes a 
series of situational occurrences questioning the usefulness and positive impact of large 
donor states such as China to smaller developing economies. China has dealt the 
international order a blow by scaling up investment throughout the African continent at 
the same time as the European Union and the United States are reducing aid, investment, 
and assistance programs. The resultant actions may lead to another “scramble for Africa” 
between the major powers, with one of the many beneficiaries being the higher place 
these states will have in future international forum and organizations.40
Using ASEAN, NAFTA, and the SCO as preliminaries for FDI packages and 
investment groups, China has been able to successfully adapt models of inter-Asian 
development for use on the African continent, even embracing the US Dollar and Euro as 
a means of fiscal inclusion toward these emerging economies. The transitory nature and 
development of Chinese FDI and development loan structures versus Western versions of
it, allows for a certain flexibility to deal with regulatory bodies and oversight from IOs 
and other regional organizations. This would help avoiding certain situations such as the 
case of copper mining in Zambia. The focus on the extractive nature of Chinese industrial
investment has made that local communities and domestic political structures in the 
potential opposition of being usurped and/or sidestepped in order to undermine its 
authority over those Chinese projects.
40 Campbell, Horace. "China in Africa: challenging US global hegemony." Third World Quarterly: 29, no. 1 
(2008): Pg. 104
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The practices of Chinese large-scale investments, the use of GONGOs 
(government organized NGOs), and third party companies to facilitate state-financed 
assistance, is often outside of the prying eyes of the international community. The lack of 
transparency of many Chinese investment projects, particularly concerning raw materials 
and heavy industry is used to develop a rubric to overcome the challenges of effectively 
monitoring Chinese economic practices. This paper helps establish guidelines to 
understanding Chinese industrial investment and its potential consequences to the 
political and legal authority over the future development of Zambia’s natural resource 
wealth. The lessons learned and strategies established in it will become helpful when 
defining the potential pitfalls of invest and correcting those issue; at least in public 
perception.41 
4) The Nigerian petroleum industry
a) History of Chinese assistance
The People’s Republic of China has emerged rapidly recent years. Historically, 
China has infrequently concerned itself with affairs and dealings outside of its borders (or
41 Haglund, Dan. "Regulating FDI in weak African states: a case study of Chinese copper mining in 
Zambia." The journal of modern African studies 46, no. 04 (2008): Pg. 547
32
region). Due in part to the globalization of markets, advanced communications, and an 
unstable world-order, China has gone beyond its normal spheres of influence, becoming 
involved in global trade, foreign aid, and military might.
“The major beneficiaries of the Chinese boom have been Angola 
and Sudan. Angola, currently Africa’s second largest oil producer after 
Nigeria, is China’s top supplier, providing more than 400,000 barrels per 
day, or close to 15 percent of China’s oil imports, comparable to U.S. oil 
imports from Angola. Plagued by decades of war, burdened by 
reconstruction costs, and castigated by international development 
institutions for lack of transparency in oil revenue management, the 
Angolans have welcomed China’s interest. In return for concessions and 
oil contracts, the Chinese are providing financial incentives. A $2 billion 
line of credit (1.5 percent interest over 17 years) by the EximBank of 
China has helped finance vital infrastructure in this post-conflict economy,
and an additional $2 billion loan was granted in 2006.”42
As the world’s largest manufacturer, importer, and exporter, China was eventually
poised to move into new and emerging markets, particularly in the Global South. Political
and economic expansion into Africa has proved to be to the development of 21st century 
China what westward expansion and Manifest Destiny was to the development of 19th 
century America. Not only are new opportunities being created everyday across every 
industry, but the effect of an economic Wild West on Chinese venture capitalism and 
42 Zafar, Ali. "The growing relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic, trade, 
investment, and aid links." The World Bank Research Observer 22.1 (2007): Pg. 119
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industrial behavior will help propel a new philosophy of investment in stark contrast to 
the conservative actions and motivations of the past. Furthermore, the benefits and 
dividends produced by this practice of developing wide ranged, multifaceted bilateral 
relationships has intrinsically altered the Chinese government’s approach to foreign 
relations, and particularly its newfound aggressive approach to its foreign policy toward 
the Global South. 
Central Africa is at the apex of entering an upward economic and political 
trajectory from a forgotten colonial ruin into a series of key international players in the 
decades to come. “In what concerns the oil sector China has made  major investments 
(upstream and downstream – refineries and pipelines) not only in other established major 
oil producers such as Sudan (since 1998) and more recently in Nigeria,  but  also  in  
smaller  producing  states  (Gabon,  Congo-B)  and  new  producers (Equatorial Guinea, 
Chad).”43 The great strides China was made in the world economic system and its 
burgeoning trade and cultural relationships with the Global South will be essential to 
recognizing and comprehending the development of the Chinese government’s mindset 
with respect to understanding its current and future foreign policy positions.
“In essence, Africa is primarily as source of crude materials and 
also a market for Chinese finished goods.  For example, Sudan is a major 
oil supplier to China, currently accounting for 7.7% of Chinese total oil 
imports.  Also, China has become the third major purchaser of oil from 
Gabon, after the United States and France, and trade relations between the 
43 Alden, Chris, and Ana Cristina Alves. “China and Africa's natural resources: The challenges and 
implications for development and governance.” Johannesburg: South African Institute of International 
Affairs, (2009): Pg. 16
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two countries are expanding. For example, over 60% of Gabon’s timber is 
exported to Asia, mainly to China.”44
The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) has actively been seeking 
further Chinese investments make the Nigerian natural gas sector as modern and efficient 
as the domestic petroleum industry. The desire is to generate and attract $50 billion USD 
to improve and expand infrastructure development. 38 Chinese companies were involved 
in the agreements, including Sinopec. Nigeria requires investment to expanded non-petrol
fuel and power production. Despite a large amount of natural energy wealth, refineries 
and natural gas plants have become increasingly overworked and underserviced. The 
expansion of these sectors cannot move forward without fixing the issues already 
plaguing them. 
b) Effects of Nigerian production and market share
The Federal Republic of Nigeria is among the most populous countries in the 
world and currently boasts the largest economy in Africa. A geographically large and 
diverse state, its economic success is based on strong petroleum exports and a diverse 
collection of other industries such as agriculture/cattle, manufacturing, and 
telecommunications. “The extractive sector in the Nigerian economy is large and 
extensive, with oil playing a dominant role. With nearly 37.2 billion barrels in reserve 
and 2.13% of global production, Nigeria has the world’s tenth largest proven reserves 
(3.1% of global reserves), and is among the top 10 oil producers.”45 Its geographical 
44 Ajakaiye, Olu. “China and Africa: opportunities and challenges.” AERC Scoping Studies on China-Africa 
Economic Relations, (2006): Pg. 5
45 Akinlo, Anthony Enisan. "How important is oil in Nigeria’s economic growth?." Journal of Sustainable 
Development 5.4 (2012): Pg. 167
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location on the Gulf of Guinea not only gives it direct access over some of the world’s 
largest untapped oil deposits, but also convenient and natural trade links with South 
America and Europe.
At the same time as Nigeria’s economic growth accelerated, the People’s Republic
of China began a major foreign policy and trade shift toward cooperation, regional 
development, and investment on the African continent. The traditional ties of Africa’s 
communities and governing bodies are taking a backseat to the larger macroeconomic 
forces requiring a large scale revamp of central banking and industrial development in 
conjunction with increasing lucrative trade partnerships between state controlled African 
resources, such as Nigeria’s basin oil, and the evolution of Chinese MNCs and venture 
capital. . “Oil is the fiscal basis for the Nigerian state, accounting for over 90% of export 
earnings and 80% of federal revenues. Perhaps the most contentious role of the Nigerian 
state relates to the distribution of oil revenues in a multi-ethnic, but highly centralized 
federation. At its heart in the feeling that oil wealth from the Niger Delta is controlled by 
ethnic-majority ruling elites from other, non-oil producing parts of the country, which 
dominate the federal government, while the ethnic minorities in the region that produces 
the oil – the “goose that lays the golden eggs” – suffer from neglect, pollution, and 
underdevelopment.”46 There is a vulnerability to become addicted, so to speak, to Chinese
imports and hard currency.  The trade imbalance currently shows that for every dollar 
coming into Nigerian central banks due to exports to China; three dollars are being spent 
46 Obi, Cyril I. "Oil extraction, dispossession, resistance, and conflict in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta." 
Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d'études du développement 30.1-2 (2010): 
Pg. 223
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importing goods from China.47  The imbalance is only growing from almost two decades 
of increasing reliance on the East Asia trade cycles. 
c) Public perception
The Chinese relationship with Central Africa is among the most important 
economic, political, and developing partnerships in current international relations. Shared
interests and economic gains have flourished in a security collaboration and cultural 
exchange program unlike most others seen between other major world powers and Africa.
“China puts  a  lot  of  importance  to  good  relations  with African
political  elite,  which  in  respect  holds  generally positive views of 
China. This however opens up space for  political  opposition  which  
might  try  to  capitalize  an  anti-Chinese  agenda.  When looking at how 
different parts of society organize in reaction to China, the effect of unions
is remarkable. In countries where unions are traditionally strong and 
represent a large part  of  the  population,  they can  bargain  better  
conditions  for  their  members. This is another way of saying that Chinese
companies bring in Chinese workers and pay low wages to locals 
whenever the legal situation allows it while it complies with them when 
law and enforcement mechanisms are in place.”48 
47 Agubamah, Edgar. "Bilateral relations: periscoping Nigeria and China relations." European Scientific 
Journal 10.14 (2014): Pg. 67
48 Rebol, Max. "Public perceptions and reactions: Gauging African views of China in Africa." Alternatives: 
Turkish Journal of International Relations 9.4 (2010): Pg. 160.
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In fact the close partnership and ties between Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria and 
China has been a major catalyst for the rise in those countries’ GDP, and their increased 
share of the global marketplace.”
A report prepared for the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) 
analyzed the use and impact of Chinese aid to Africa in terms of health. The health sector 
includes the building of a healthcare infrastructure, the training of doctors and nurses, the 
use of medicines and materials, the use of Chinese medical personnel, the promotion of 
better nutrition and pilot programs designed to incorporate both American and Chinese 
health development projects within several African states. As a result of past experiences 
by other countries China has built a model in which “free aid’ was replaced with a policy 
of economic aid which functions to provide “equality, reciprocity, effectiveness, and 
diversity.” While much of the focus of the report is on American-Chinese relations in 
African health aid, the data on the methodology of Chinese aid, its terminology and 
thought-process, and the transition to the status as predominant donor.49
The concepts of the promotion African “ownership” over its development and 
capital investment programs are based largely on the fairly accurate assumption of the 
inherent corrupt nature of local regimes, lax regulatory environments and extractive 
industrial practices. The scope of the hurdles facing FDI in Africa needs to be reassessed 
to deal with the realities and possibly reforms on the ground are varied and excessive. 
Development without constraints sometimes leads to a regressive economic climate. 
“Comparing the country experiences, it points out the conditions accounting for the 
49 Freeman, Charles, and Xiaoqing Lu Boynton. "China’s Emerging Global Health and
Foreign Aid Engagement in Africa." Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (2011).
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varying success of eight African countries: Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania and Zambia. It concludes by asking whether the 
conditions African countries face in further loan negotiations are changing.”50 Defining 
new investments on the terms and conditions of strategies on the part of donor states will 
promote reformed economic habits and institutions on the part of African states post-IMF
debt crisis. Understanding the new normal with reference to Chinese industrial 
investment and development loans will lead to a better understanding and mapping of the 
broader strategies and tactics involved in the planning, facilitation, and execution of 
intentional financial investment and its effect on the growth of Africa GDP.51
In order to counteract some of the major trade imbalance Nigeria adopted an act 
which provided for the domestic inclusion in the development of the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry: The Nigerian Oil & Gas Industry Content Development Act 2010, known also 
as the “Local Content Act” sought to grow the local economy by spreading the petroleum
jobs to otherwise underserved groups and reduced the demand for foreign workers and 
other extractive elements in the industry. While not specifically aimed at increased 
Chinese influence over that industry, the law was meant to alleviate some of the 
regionalism plaguing the sentiments of those living in oil rich areas that hadn’t properly 
benefited from its contribution to the growing economy. 
The Act originates from the “Nigerian Content Policy” which sought to increase 
Nigerian domestic participation in the main sector of economy growth while training 
citizens in the jobs necessary to run the sector efficiently, and safely. The promotion of 
50 Whitfield, Lindsay, ed. “The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors:
African Strategies for Dealing with Donors.” Oxford University Press, (2008)
51 Whitfield, Lindsay, ed., Oxford University Press, (2008)
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local workers utilizing local resources to create circular wealth generation has also 
expanded to other aspects of Nigerian heavy industry. Among the provisions in the act 
were that fair bids by Nigerian companies be given primary consideration when 
developing new petrol-infrastructure. In order to be considered a Nigerian company 51% 
of the equity must be owned by Nigerians. Permits would be granted to Nigerian 
companies; preferentially. Only 5% of all managerial positions could be held by expats. A
minimum of 10% of the generated revenue must be held in Nigerian banks, and a 
framework be put in place for the reduction of taxes for those companies building or 
expanding facilities directly related to the industry.52  
“All regulatory authorities, operators, contractors, subcontractors, 
alliance partners and other entities involved in any project, operation, 
activity or transaction in the Nigerian oil and gas industry are required to 
consider Nigerian content as an important element of their projects. 
Nigerian independent operators shall be given priority in the award of oil 
blocks, oil field and oil lifting licenses as well as in all projects for which 
contracts are to be awarded in the Nigerian petroleum industry subject to 
the fulfilment of conditions specified by the Minister of Petroleum 
Resources.”53 
In the current era of rapid globalization across every sector and facet of the human
experience, it is commerce and trade which drive progress and the will of states to engage
52 Atsegbua, Lawrence Asekome. "The Nigerian oil and gas industry content development act 2010: An 
examination of its regulatory framework." OPEC Energy Review 36.4 (2012): Pg 480




in peaceful cooperation instead of aggressive coercion. No longer can empires colonialize
and exploit conquered populations at will, though in some cases it may happen more 
quietly and insidiously. It is the global marketplace that is bringing states together that 
would never interact with each other under the rules of past eras. Understanding the 
goals, priorities, actions, and thought process of Chinese foreign policy is essential for 
every other world power if they desire to remain relevant, successful, and active in global
trade and politics. The Chinese-African partnership appears to be a long term and 
mutually beneficial foreign policy on the part of both countries. This relationship should 
be closely studied by the Western economies to learn from the successes and pitfalls of 
the “Chinese way” of conducting intercontinental commerce and market expansion. 
Sometimes it takes an outside and fresh angle to put the greater goals and ambitions of 
global leaders and emerging economies into perspective.
5) Chinese advances into Africa strategic and commercial mining sectors
In this section I will explain the resource needs and situation of China and how it 
impacts the size and shape of their economic international with the desired country. 
Furthermore, the Chinese interaction with various regional and international 
organizations will be explained in the context of how it affects business practices, reform 
of past errors and future development plans for the African continent. 
a) Overall assessment of minerals, locations, and controlling interests
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The dominant motives behind China's increasing financial presence in Africa in 
the last decade based on empirical quantitative evidence on Chinese outward foreign 
direct investment across 29 African countries from the period 2003–2006 was created to 
examine and to assign priorities within different economic and development sectors.
“Chinese ministry of commerce summarized the main aim of 
government policy towards Nigeria into three (3) points they are as 
follows: (i) to increase Chinese Multinational Companies in the Nigerian 
market share. (ii) To expand the Nigerian market for Chinese 
manufactured goods. (iii) To increase China’s presence in Nigeria oil and 
gas sector and leverage its investment in Nigeria as a gateway for entering 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) market.”54 
This concludes that Chinese FDI is heavily influenced by the presence of large-
scale raw materials within its invest opportunities of choice and that the more lax the 
environmental and government protections over industry, the more likely Chinese third 
party companies will set up shop and begin to build its industrial capacities there. The 
need for raw materials, the need for strategic and lucrative resource access has prompted 
Chinese intervention on an economic scale that rivals the Marshal Plan. The contention in
this work can be used to assess the international reactions to Chinese capital injections 
into the industrial and mining sectors of the Zambian economy and the long term 
potential effects of aid and investment dependency due to a lake of controls on 
construction waste disposal and local participation in that particular economic sector. The
54 Izuchukwu, Oji-Okoro, and Daniel Ofori. "Why south-south fdi is booming: case study of china fdi in 
nigeria." Asian Economic and Financial Review 4.3 (2014): Pg. 362
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needs of the industrial capacity of Chinese companies and their ability to redirect that 
capital are also cause for concern among more established Western donor states.55
 There is acknowledgment that this type of priority assessment becomes 
“problematic in terms of development impact, as Chinese investment feeds into the 
institutional dysfunctions of resource-rich countries.”56 The realities of Chinese FDI are 
in essence the same as those of Western investment; namely the ability to gain access to 
these industrial rich materials in the least expensive way exploiting institutional and 
localized corruption and lax regulation for increased profits.
b) Largest continental partners and local public perception of Chinese inclusion
The historical development of China’s advocacy of the “principle of 
noninterference” in wider African foreign policy finds that in spite of China’s consistent 
vocal support for noninterference over the past decades, the significance of the principle 
in shaping Beijing’s foreign policy decisions has varied as its pragmatic interests have 
shifted toward becoming a global leader.
“China’s current emphasis on the doctrine of noninterference is shaped by 
its perceived strategic self-interests. Engaging African states without 
prejudice to their domestic policies or political composition and honoring 
their right to noninterference facilitates important economic objectives, 
such as acquiring the raw materials and energy supplies required to fuel 
55 Kragelund, Peter. "Knocking on a wide-open door: Chinese investments in Africa." Review
of African Political Economy 36, no. 122 (2009): Pg. 481
56 Kolstad, Ivar, and Arne Wiig. "Better the devil you know? Chinese foreign direct
investment in Africa." Journal of African Business 12, no. 1 (2011): Pg. 37
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China’s rapid economic growth, opening markets to its abundant 
manufactured exports and providing its companies with investment 
opportunities.”57 
The need for new markets to expand China’s export-heavy economy and the 
expansion of access to raw materials for Chinese production has led to the natural 
conclusion that overall invest and development has to be increased further. Beijing has 
found limiting its actions though the scope of its philosophical approach toward 
noninterference is less than realistic and as “recurrences of regional instability and anti-
Chinese populism have threatened its interests, citizens, and assets on the continent, will 
likely take a more forceful role in its relations with partner states.” This will establish 
guidelines for the transition of Chinese political philosophy in dealing with the global 
south and meeting its economic realities with regard to market expansion and resource 
extraction.58 “In September 2011, Michael Sata won Zambia's presidency largely by 
tapping into anti-Chinese resentments after Chinese managers shot protesters at a large 
coal mine in southern Zambia one year prior. In 2013, Lamido Sanusi, governor of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria, compared China’s presence on the continent to “a new form of 
imperialism.”59 Nigerians brought petitions to their local and central governments 
cataloging their objections to the labor conditions in Chinese owned factories. Nigeria’s 
trade unions have subsequently joined in the lobbying for increased accountability and 
57 Hess, Steve, and Richard Aidoo. "Beyond the Rhetoric: Noninterference in China’s African
Policy." African and Asian Studies 9, no. 3 (2010): Pg. 365
58 Hess, Steve, and Richard Aidoo. (2010): Pg. 359
59 Alessi, Christopher, and Beina Xu. "China in Africa." Council on Foreign Relations. (2016)
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the establishment of economic safeguards they feel are required due to the loss of small 
scale manufacturing jobs due to the massive increase in cheaper Chinese imports. And 
due to the lack of will to update and expand tax collections when imported goods come 
across the large boarder, the income generated by tariffs and importation taxes doesn’t 
find itself going into the government’s coffers. China is seen as a partner to Africa, but 
also as a competitor. The need for FDI and development assistance outweighs the 
domestic ideological or political concerns over the continued expanded role China has in 
Nigeria, and specifically its energy producing sectors. Leaders in conjunction with the 
African Development Bank have supported Nigeria’s Central Bank taking on a more 
“activist role”, providing refinancing to banks exposed to defaulted loans by small 
manufactures and those companies suffering from debilitating inflated repayments. While
some accuse China of “predatory” trade practices, the short and long term development 
of the region, if properly managed will create stronger independent markets with 
beneficial ties to Beijing and each other.
 Within Chinese forging policy in regard to development loans in the Global 
South, the use of different strategies when dealing with various types of governments, 
political units, and ethnic groups provides an excellent series of case studies to evaluate 
short and long term Chinese political goals. ASEAN interrelations helped develop and 
form the current FDI loan policies being spread by Beijing within the African continent. 
The historic and current evolution of these policies can act as predictors for future 
behaviors within investment, development packages, and wider bilateral industrial 
projects. The conceptualization of the evolution of Chinese development projects will 
help establish a set of guidelines and build a framework to better understand and explain 
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the political nature of this type of economic interaction. This framework can produce a 
clear line from third party development projects back to the main foreign policy outreach 
and analysis of the Foreign Ministry in Beijing.60
c) Future developments within Africa
The fear and criticism of Chinese large-scale industrial and development 
investment in Africa is built on a well-founded belief that China actively undermines the 
sovereign authority of host governments in economically untapped and underutilized 
local economies.  The debates surrounding this economic ascendency come with certain 
prejudices. Their goal is to also call out many western analysts who routinely “ignore the 
longer term motivations and modalities of Chinese aid and the historical diversity of 
Chinese relations with Africa, but also uncritically assumes ‘Western’ aid to be morally 
‘better’ and ‘more effective’ in terms of development outcomes.” The broader trends are 
just not that simple, and Beijing is probably not that shortsighted with an aim toward 
further economic expansion and financial integration of new markets. Secondary 
elements of this paper compare and contrast the approaches to dual case studies within 
the use of FDI in Ghana and Angola. This builds a structure to chart historic trends in the 
expansion and maintenance of large advanced development infrastructure. The primary 
argument focused on comparing the different governing and ideological practices are 
used by both the Chinese and the west in their manipulations of Africa’s inherent 
weaknesses and corruption. While this will not specifically cover western FDI practices, 
60 Lum, Thomas, Hannah Fischer, Julissa Gomez-Granger, and Anne Leland. "China's foreign aid activities 
in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia." Russia China and Eurasia-Social Historical and Cultural Issues 
25, no. 2 (2009): Pg. 175
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the development of capital dependency has at its root a commonality in western financial 
practices.61
6) Conclusions
61 Tan‐Mullins, May, Giles Mohan, and Marcus Power. "Redefining ‘aid’ in the China Africa
context." Development and Change 41, no. 5 (2010): Pg. 860 
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The nature of hegemonic led financial relationships tends to settle within 
the grey area between exploitive and benevolent patronage.  While the countries in 
question overwhelmingly depend on their agricultural sectors for the bulk of their GDP, 
and technical assistance afforded them in their bilateral relations with the Chinese 
government, its sponsored corporations and affiliates, has been a sincere net-positive for 
those countries’ agricultural development. In the mining and transportation sectors, the 
strength of Chinese pressure to control and guide domestic African industries, coupled 
with the slow but steady control over the nature of industrial finance, has created a 
situation where, while the African states in question are clearly benefiting from the 
changes and investment. The petroleum industry represents the main goal for Chinese 
FDI to expand and control. The increase in their influence over the extraction, refinement
and transportation of this vital strategic natural resource is fueling the domestic Chinese 
economy, as well as increasing its energy independence. The time and effort made to 
expand Chinese bilateral relations in the region and the use of commercial diplomacy are 
helping to ensure Chinese dominance in the world of African oil. The fear of ‘Dutch 
disease’ and the use of trade as purely a coercive tactic  aren’t out of the realm of 
possibility, but there is much to be gained by mutual cooperation and it looks as if the 
benefits of intimately linking the energy sectors far outweigh the potential dangers. The 
ability for China to use this policy of noninterference to expand relationships to states 
hesitant to take on foreign partners is at the forefront of Beijing’s diplomatic overtures. 
Many of these states are less concerned with Chinese working conditions, the diplomatic 
stance of Taiwan, and environmental protection than they are of developed countries 
exploiting them for material gain. By advocating for a political hands-off approach China
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has won over many emerging economies and dozens of smaller allies. This in turn 
translates to an increase in secured access to the economic resources and domestic 
markets of those states. The expansion of Sino-African relations is vital to the long term 
economic ambitions of Beijing. 
The short term gains are being spread throughout only a small powerful segment 
of the population, and there is clear possibility of serious exploitation and loss of 
sovereignty to third party Chinese companies. The investment of long term capital, 
equipment, technical personnel and industrial manpower, set the stage for an insidious 
economic takeover for the most strategic and valuable industries these African states 
possess. The short term capital saturation in the form of lucrative loans or the leasing of 
heavy equipment has helped define the immediate corporate actors. The readied access of
on-the-ground technical expertise has allowed Chinese companies to adopt positions of 
political and strategic advantage. 
The concept of the effect of FDI on African business and social culture wasn’t 
covered within the framework of this paper, but it’s a topic that should be given more 
focus and discussion. It would be a fascinating follow-up piece alongside the changes 
undergone by the evolving nature of Chinese economic diplomacy. The access to and 
increased refinement of the major African deposits of raw materials will represent a larger
controlling share of those assets due to other dwindling supplies around the world. The 
components and mechanisms fueling our current technological revolution depend on 
those industries and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. The Chinese 
corporate system acting in accordance with Beijing’s style of economic diplomacy is 
building bridges across continents to combine markets in an unequaled way. Nigeria is 
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one of dozens of countries in Central Africa with an effective economic and political 
relationship with Beijing, but due to its centralized state, and developed industrial base, it
is the ideal operating ground for ever expanding Chinese economic ventures in Africa and
throughout the Global South. 
50
7) Bibliography
Abbas, Hakima, and Yves Niyiragira, eds. “Aid to Africa: redeemer or coloniser?”. 
Fahamu/Pambazuka, (2009)
Agubamah, Edgar. "Bilateral relations: periscoping Nigeria and China relations." 
European Scientific Journal 10.14 (2014)
Ajakaiye, Olu. “China and Africa: opportunities and challenges.” AERC Scoping 
Studies on China-Africa Economic Relations, (2006)
Akinlo, Anthony Enisan. "How important is oil in Nigeria’s economic growth?." Journal 
of Sustainable Development 5.4 (2012)
Alden, Chris, and Ana Cristina Alves. “China and Africa's natural resources: The 
challenges and implications for development and governance.” Johannesburg: South 
African Institute of International Affairs, (2009)
Alden, Chris, and Martyn Davies. "A profile of the operations of Chinese multinationals 
in Africa." South African journal of International Affairs 13.1 (2006)
Alden, Chris, and Christopher R. Hughes. "Harmony and discord in China's Africa 
strategy: some implications for foreign policy." The China Quarterly 199 (2009)
Alden, Chris, and Daniel Large. "China's exceptionalism and the challenges of delivering
difference in Africa." Journal of Contemporary China 20.68 (2011)
Alessi, Christopher, and Beina Xu. "China in Africa." Council on Foreign Relations. 
(Nov 2016)
Ando, Mitsuyo. "Impacts of FTAs in East Asia: CGE simulation analysis." RIETI DP 
Series (2009)
Annen, Kurt, and Stephen Kosempel. "Foreign Aid, Donor Fragmentation, and 
Economic Growth." The BE Journal of Macroeconomics 9, no. 1 (2009)
51
Atsegbua, Lawrence Asekome. "The Nigerian oil and gas industry content development 
act 2010: An examination of its regulatory framework." OPEC Energy Review 36.4 
(2012)
Bearce, David H., and Daniel C. Tirone. "Foreign aid effectiveness and the strategic 
goals of donor governments." The Journal of Politics 72, no. 03 (2010)
Bräutigam, Deborah. "Chinese Development Aid in Africa: What, where, why, and how 
much?." ANU E Press: (2011)
Bräutigam, Deborah, and Tang Xiaoyang. "China's engagement in African agriculture: 
Down to the countryside.” The China Quarterly 199 (2009)
Campbell, Horace. "China in Africa: challenging US global hegemony." Third World 
Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2008)
Carmody, Pádraig. “The new scramble for Africa.” Polity, (2011)
Davies, Martyn, et al. "How China delivers development assistance to Africa." 
Stellenbosch: Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch (2008)
Downs, Erica Strecker. "The fact and fiction of Sino-African energy relations." China 
Security, Vol. 3 No. 3 Summer 2007, World Security Institute, (2007)
Effah-Attoe, Stella. "The Development of Transportation System in the Cross River Basin
of Nigeria: The Era of British Colonial Rule, 1888-1950." Sankofa Journal of the 
Humanities 3.2 (2005)
Freeman, Charles, and Xiaoqing Lu Boynton. "China’s Emerging Global Health and 
Foreign Aid Engagement in Africa." Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (2011)
Gill, Bates, Chin-hao Huang, and J. Stephen Morrison. "Assessing China’s growing 
influence in Africa." China Security 3.3 (2007)
Glaser, Bonnie S., and Evan S. Medeiros. "The changing ecology of foreign policy-
making in China: the ascension and demise of the theory of “peaceful rise”." The China 
Quarterly 190, (2007)
Haglund, Dan. "Regulating FDI in weak African states: a case study of Chinese copper 
mining in Zambia." The journal of modern African studies 46, no. 04 (2008)
52
Hess, Steve, and Richard Aidoo. "Beyond the Rhetoric: Noninterference in China’s 
African Policy." African and Asian Studies 9, no. 3 (2010)
Ikejiaku, Brian-Vincent. "Africa Debt Crisis and the IMF with a Case of Nigeria: 
towards Theoretical explanations." Journal of Politics and Law 1, no. 4 (2008)
Ikpefan, Ochei Ailemen. "Challenges of Public-Private Partnership in Infrastructure 
Financing in Nigeria." The Nigerian Accounting Horizon, University of Jos 4.1: (2008)
Insaidoo, Kwame A. “CHINA: the New Imperialists & Neo-Colonialists in Africa?” 
Author House, (2016)
Ismaila, U., et al. "Cereals production in Nigeria: Problems, constraints and 
opportunities for betterment." African Journal of Agricultural Research 5.12 (2010)
 
Izuchukwu, Oji-Okoro, and Daniel Ofori. "Why south-south fdi is booming: case study of
china fdi in nigeria." Asian Economic and Financial Review 4.3 (2014)
Kolstad, Ivar, and Arne Wiig. "Better the devil you know? Chinese foreign direct 
investment in Africa." Journal of African Business 12, no. 1 (2011)
Kragelund, Peter. "Knocking on a wide-open door: Chinese investments in Africa." 
Review of African Political Economy 36, no. 122 (2009)
Lafargue, François. "China’s presence in Africa." China perspectives 61 (2005).
Leitch, Guy. “NIGERIA & CHINA SIGN.” RailwaysAfrica, (2015)
Lengauer, Sara. "China's foreign aid policy: Motive and method," Culture Mandala: The 
Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies: Vol. 9: Iss. 2, Article
3: (2011)
Li, Jing, et al. "The Two‐Tier Bargaining Model Revisited: Theory and Evidence from 
China's Natural Resource Investments in Africa." Global Strategy Journal 3.4 (2013)
Lum, Thomas, Hannah Fischer, Julissa Gomez-Granger, and Anne Leland. "China's 
foreign aid activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia." Russia China and 
Eurasia-Social Historical and Cultural Issues 25, no. 2 (2009)
53
Moyo, Dambisa. “Dead aid: Why aid is not working and how there is a better way for 
Africa.” Macmillan, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, New York (2009)
Nabine, D. "The impact of Chinese investment and trade on Nigeria economic growth." 
ATPC Work in progress 77 (2009)
Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act, 2010 
http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/January%202016/Nigerian%20Oil%20and%20Gas
%20Industry%20Content%20Development%20Act%202010.pdf
Obi, Cyril I. "Oil extraction, dispossession, resistance, and conflict in Nigeria's oil-rich 
Niger Delta." Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d'études du 
développement 30.1-2 (2010)
Olukayode, Iwaloye Ojo. "Supporting Infrastructures Provisions: A Ownership or 
Location Advantages for Resources seeking Chinese firms in Developing Markets." 
Africa Review, United Nations Department of Public Information. (2013)
Oyeranti, Olugboyega A., et al. "The impact of China-Africa investment relations: the 
case of Nigeria." AERC Collaborative Research China-Africa Project Policy Brief 8.6 
(2010)
Pigato, Miria, and Wenxia Tang. “China and Africa: Expanding economic ties in an 
evolving global context.” World Bank, (2015)
Pozzebon, Stefano. “China has crossed a major investment threshold that is going to 
change the entire world.” Business Insider (2015)
Rebol, Max. "Public perceptions and reactions: Gauging African views of China in 
Africa." Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 9.4 (2010)
Ruel, Huub. “Commercial Diplomacy in International Entrepreneurship: A Conceptual 
and Empirical Exploration.” Emerald Group Publishing, (2012)
Sautman, Barry, and Yan Hairong. "Trade, investment, power and the China-in-Africa 
discourse." The Asia-Pacific Journal 52, no. 3 (2009)
Sun, Yun. "Africa in China’s foreign policy." John L. Thornton China Centre and Africa 
Growth Initiative. Washington. (2014)
54
Sun, Yun. "Africa in China’s New Foreign Aid White Paper." Brookings Online. 
Washington. (2014)
Tan Mullins, May, Giles Mohan, and Marcus Power.‐  "Redefining ‘aid’in the China–
Africa context." Development and Change 41.5 (2010)
Tolulope, Apanisile Olumuyiwa, and Akinlo. Taiwo. "Rail Transport and Economic 
Growth in Nigeria (1970–2011)." Australian Journal of Business and Management 
Research Vol 3.05 (2013)
Vogel, Ezra F., and Joanne J. Myers. “Deng Xiaoping and the transformation of China.” 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press (2011)
Whalley, John. “China’s Integration in the World Economy” World Scientific Publishing 
Company (2011)
Whitfield, Lindsay. “The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors: 
African Strategies for Dealing with Donors.” Oxford University Press, (2008)
Zafar, Ali. "The growing relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Macroeconomic, trade, investment, and aid links." The World Bank Research Observer 
22.1, (2007)
55
